It is witnessed in virtually every nation worldwide, albeit in various forms and degrees. From the stars and stripes on every street corner July Fourth in the United States, to rallies in downtown Brussels to promote Belgian unity, nationalism is a widespread force with an admirable purpose: to create a sense of pride for one’s country or community, and learn to value that community’s cultural, social and political make-up. Still, despite its honorable raison d’être, not all strains of nationalism are positive, and in some instances, they incite violence, persecution and the loss of both personal and civil liberties.
Today, while nationalism is often used as the pretext for human rights violations and unlawful acts, it is most dangerous when incorporated within a political sphere of influence. In fact, the use of nationalism as a harmful political tool can clearly be seen in the case of Turkey, a country struggling between East and West, democracy and authoritarianism, and modern and traditional values. And almost ironically, it is the institutions of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the beloved founder and first President of the Turkish Republic who so badly wanted his country to become like its Western, democratic neighbors, which have preserved this misguided sense of nationalism close to 80 years after they were first instated.
“There is much to justify Turkey’s reverence for Atatürk. He is the force that allowed Turkey to rise form the ashes of defeat and emerge as a vibrant new nation. Without Atatürk’s vision, without his ambition and energy, without his astonishing boldness in sweeping away traditions accumulated over centuries, today’s Turkey would not exist and the world would be much poorer” (Kinzer 36). Indeed, Atatürk’s legacies to the Turkish state are the institutions he created, and the hope he spread throughout the country by means of his courageous reforms in the 1920s and ‘30s. Nonetheless, in today’s Turkish society, those institutions now succeed in promoting a sense of ultra-nationalism, and granting a lawful excuse for violent and oppressive acts.
The military’s ability to intervene in the democratic process, censorship of all dissident opinions or practices, and an ongoing debate on whether or not women should have access to government buildings or universities while wearing a headscarf are all examples of issues in Turkish society today that can be directly linked to Atatürk’s reforms. As such, despite having reached near-Godly stature in Turkey – with his dedicated following of worshipers and his own religion, Kemalism (Kinzer 35) – Atatürk’s true legacy is heavily influenced by the country’s present-day internal conflicts, and the extreme nationalism he has effectively allowed to flourish.
“Nationalism, in my opinion, is nothing more than an idealistic rationalization for militarism and aggression. Nationalism is an infantile disease. It is the measles of mankind,” said Albert Einstein (HeartQuotes). With this in mind, the following paper will analyze the way in which Atatürk’s reforms have preserved Turkish nationalism and the extreme violence, censorship and human rights violations that go along with it. Further, it will link Turkish nationalism and Kemalist ideologies to Turkey’s present-day bid for European Union membership, and how ironically, despite being the driving force behind the country’s Westernization, it may indeed be Atatürk’s reforms that have left EU accession talks at a standstill.
Secular Change
As Kinzer states, “trying to understand Turkey without understanding Atatürk would be like studying European history without considering Christianity” (36). Indeed, Atatürk’s place in the Turkish history books is not only substantial, but it also proves just how influential his reforms were in shaping the country. After being sworn in as President by the Grand National Assembly (which at the same time also declared Turkey to be a republic) on October 29, 1923, Atatürk immediately began implementing a vast slew of reforms that, at the time, seemed courageous to some, and outrageous to others. (Roskin and Coyle 128 ) For instance, in 1924, he “announced… the revival of a pure Islam untainted by politics,” and to do so, abolished the caliphate (the highest Muslim religious leader), the office of the Shaykh al-Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. (Roskin and Coyle 128 ) Further, he replaced traditional Islamic law, Shari’a, with the Swiss civil code and mandated the use of the Latin alphabet instead of an Arabic/Ottoman one. (Roskin and Coyle 130)
Atatürk’s reforms also heavily influenced gender equality within the country. Those reforms, Janet Browning summarized (1), included making polygamy (and marriage without the consent of both partners) illegal, the equalization of inheritance rights between male and female heirs, the establishment of equal pay for equal work regardless of gender, and the right to vote and stand election in municipal and national elections for women. “Through constitutional, juridical and political reforms, through reform of the educational system and through his attacks on the prevailing ideology, he sought to accomplish changes in the superstructure, making inroads from all directions. Indeed, he was so determined that people would accept the changed social institutions that he was prepared to use force if necessary,” Browning states (2).
Still, by outlawing the headscarf in public (and inside all government buildings including most notably universities), Atatürk presented many Turkish women with a difficult ultimatum: whether or not wearing a headscarf was worth the sacrifice of not having an education, or living in fear of religious persecution. “Unlike America where secularism is separation of church and state, in Turkey (and many other lands) secularism means the subjugation of church to state,” Roskin and Coyle found (128 ). Indeed, “by attacking [the headscarf] Atatürk had made clear that he considered nothing sacred simply because it was long-established.” (Kinzer, 44) The debate surrounding the headscarf still rages throughout Turkish society today, with some viewing it as the expression of religious freedoms, and others as an example of religious symbols unnecessarily mixing into a supposedly secular state. And ultimately, this example demonstrates that “in [Atatürk’s] system, pluralism, personal freedom and individuality do not fit.” (Konstantinidis, 6)
Nonetheless, “Atatürk, indeed, had many other talents than simple power of imagination: not only had he the determination, but… a tremendous gift of timing and measuring what could be accomplished,” Artun Unsal reported (29). Still, some progressive Ottomans shared Atatürk’s vision for Turkey, and so the only difference between Atatürk and his predecessors then, was that Atatürk had the ability to make his reforms a reality whereas those before him were guilty of using empty rhetoric, Unsal found (29). “Atatürk was going to realize many of the ‘dreams’ of the progressive Ottomans. Evidently, Atatürk had the genius of realizing them, in contrast to others, who had only made statements in the best intellectual tradition.” (Unsal, 29) In fact, Kinzer wrote (42):
Perhaps alone in Turkey and even the world, Mustafa Kemal believed that Turks could become everything they had never been: modern, secular, prosperous and, above all, truly European, He became a one-man revolution, pushing and dragging a baffled and sometimes resistant nation toward the radical vision that blazed in his imagination.
Further, Atatürk replaced the Muslim calendar with a European one (Kinzer 43), and “rewarded Ankara for supporting the Nationalists by declaring it the country’s capital” (Roskin and Coyle 128 ) He also outlawed the fez – “the symbol of attachment of male Turks to Islam” (Hale 272) – and replaced it with brim hats, since “a brim kept a pious Muslim from touching his forehead to the ground, part of the Muslim prayer.” (Roskin and Coyle 130) In reaction to this, “the chief mufti of Egypt, who since the abolition of the caliphate had become a leading voice of Islam, proclaimed that any Muslim who wore a hat was an infidel and a sinner.” (Kinzer 44) Lastly, the Third Grand National Assembly Parliament (1927-1931) “disestablished Islam as the state religion,” a move that officially made Turkey secular. (Roskin and Coyle 130)
Yet despite the previously mentioned positive Kemalist reforms and the fact that he was both an eloquent and charismatic leader, Charalambos Konstantinidis found (7) that Atatürk created animosity between Turkey’s various cultural and religious groups, a consequence that’s ripples are still being felt today:
Creating the myth of a unique Turkish nationality and imposing it by force, the Turkish elite awakened the defensive reflexes of threatened groups. At the same time, the promotion of secularism, as a pillar of modernity, in a Muslim country estrange the devout Muslims… Even though there was never an official definition, the new Turkish citizen was expected to be a secular, sunni Muslim speaking the Turkish language. Setting such preconditions meant excluding the nationally conscious Kurds, and to a certain extent even the politically aware Muslims, as well as the religiously heterodox Alewites, which altogether constituted about one fourth of the population.
In addition, John Tirman (2) found that Turkish Kurds were hit the hardest by Kemalist reforms. Tirman states that, “from 1923 on, Atatürk’s repression of Kurdish nationalism and even Kurdish identity was savage and predatory,” and reasons that, “the basis of the confrontation was Turkish nationalism” since its primary goal was to create a uniform Turkish state with citizens that only spoke Turkish and embraced Turkish culture above all else (2).
Further, despite his sweeping reforms, Atatürk preserved one of the Ottoman Empire’s most important tenets: the authority and prestige of the military, Konstantinidis (11) found. As one of the few successful Turkish commanders in the 1922 Turkish War of Independence with “a major battlefield victory [at Lausanne] to his credit, a magnificent one at that,” (Kinzer 38 ) Atatürk “emerged from the Great War as a hero.” (Kinzer 38 ) In fact, thanks to his military accomplishments, Kinzer found (39) that:
Mustafa Kemal was the logical figure around whom this defeated nation could rally. He eagerly embrace the savior’s role, winning the loyalty of disaffected officers and denouncing the dying regime in terms so contemptuous that its courts sentenced him to death in absentia.
Still, Atatürk’s later “reforms could not have been based merely on his – undeniably enormous – prestige as national liberator,” Konstantinidis wrote (11), concluding instead that it is the authority of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) to intervene in Turkey’s political process that both safeguarded secularism, and Atatürk’s very own Kemalist legacy.
The Protectors of Secularism
Indeed, force was mandated by Atatürk and was used in all instances when the country’s secularist quality was threatened. For instance, in May 1960, when “the ruling Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti – DP) became increasingly authoritarian and used the majoritarian framework of the 1924 Constitution to oppress the opposition Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP),” a group of officers took over, “in the name of ‘guardianship’ of the Kemalist nation-state” (CESS Task Force 23). Ultimately, as a result of the coup, a new constitution was created (in 1961) that mandated the military’s role as protector of Turkish secularism, and created the National Security Council (NSC), “established as an advisory body to the government on both internal and external security and designed to enable the military to convey their views to ministers formally” (CESS Task Force 23).
If political actions or decisions are deemed to interfere with the country’s secular landscape (as stated within the Constitution of 1924, written by Atatürk), TAF has the authority to step in. Military interventions also took place in Turkey in 1971 and 1980, and in both instances, “the military argued that they were fulfilling their legal obligation and their action had popular support” (CESS Task Force 13) As such, Atatürk created a state wherein democracy is threatened for the sake of upholding secularism (often through violence) and wherein such drastic means enjoy widespread acceptance throughout Turkish society.
Ultimately, the CESS report (13) found that:
[Atatürk] made the military an important partner in establishing and safeguarding a unitary and secular state with a reforming agenda and a European vocation. [Atatürk] embraced democracy, adopting a parliamentary system of government with the assurance that the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) would defend their 1924 Constitution if the republic’s unity or secular character (or the democratic ideal) were never endangered.
By granting TAF this ability, the “democratic ideal” has in fact been endangered, and this facet of the Constitution is primarily responsible for leaving the Turkish-EU accession talks in an uncomfortable state of limbo. Thus, “against the background of earlier interventions it is hardly surprising that the EU’s first communications on the Turkish bid for Union membership voiced concern about ‘the major role played by the army in political life.” (CESS Task Force 14) Still, the Task Force found (15) that most Turks feel that this military authority is wholly necessary, as “neither the TAF nor the Turkish electorate regarded any [of the military intervention] as fundamentally anti-democratic behavior but, rather, as extraordinary action fully necessary to safeguard democracy in the country.”
In fact, not only is the military’s role virtually unquestioned throughout Turkey, but TAF (and Atatürk, in fact) also succeeded in building a permanent and continued support base through the promotion of ultra-nationalism. Atatürk (“Speech”) said:
We owe the success to determinative cooperation between the Turkish nation and its esteemed Army. I never doubt that the great civil character of Turkish and its great civil ability will rise as a sun over high horizon of civilization, through further development. Happy is the man who calls himself a Turk.
Thus, by arguing that the success of the Turkish nation is inherently linked to the military and its ability to intervene in virtually all aspects of society, Atatürk was creating a society of individuals who blindly tie militarism to democracy, and can’t envision it any other way. As a result, as previously mentioned, Atatürk is still admired throughout most of Turkey today, and “the Atatürk faith [of Kemalism]… has its clergy, military and political elite, faithful beyond measure and ceaselessly on the watch for apostates” (Kinzer 35-36).
Turkey and the European Union
Ultimately, many Turks feel that their country is more European than anything else, and that joining the EU is a natural choice. “Under Kemal Atatürk, a concerted effort was made to redefine [Turkey’s] political identity as a nation-state on the European model, committed to secular political values, and institutional and economic modernization. As a result, most Turks tend to see their country as being more a part of Europe than of the Middle East,” William Hale found (268). Nonetheless, European leaders still have major qualms with Turkish accession, the most important of which include the political power of the TAF, restrictions placed by the Turkish Constitution on free speech, and human rights violations that are protected by Turkish law (Task Force, 31-32).
Further, the proposed five-year ban of present Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) from Turkish politics is another major blockade to EU accession talks today. The AKP is a moderate Islamic party that has moved towards allowing the headscarf to be worn inside Turkish government buildings and universities, something that has been outlawed along Atatürk’s secularist line (“Turkey’s Erdogan”). The party received 46.6 percent of the popular vote and 341 seats in July 2007’s Parliamentary elections, compared to 20.9 percent and 99 seats for the Republican People’s Party (CHP) that promotes Atatürk’s ideals (2007 Progress Report 6).
“No one can portray the AKP as a focal point against secularism. The 16.5 million people who voted for us did so believing in its (values) as a party which is democratic, secular and (is a supporter of the) principles of social rule of law,” Erdogan stated, as reported by the Trend News Agency (“Turkey’s Erdogan”). Nonetheless, as of a decision announced yesterday, the AKP narrowly avoided the ban, as “six members of Turkey’s Constitutional Court voted to close it for violating the country’s secular principles, but seven were required” (“Turkey’s Governing Party”). The party will lose some of its funding, the article explained, however it will retain its existing control of Parliament, the Presidency and the government. “By overcoming the case, the party and its supporters have prevailed over the country’s staunchly secular old guard, which has steered the country from behind the scenes since Turkey’s founding by Atatürk in 1923.” (“Turkey’s Governing Party”) Ultimately, this result is a great step forward for democracy in Turkey, and a signal to the country’s secular nationalists that things may indeed be changing.
Still, it is evident that Atatürk’s vision for Turkey would be achieved should the country join the EU. Nonetheless, it seems that Atatürk’s followers today, who are increasingly unwilling to compromise their ideals, the same ones blazed by Atatürk himself, may prevent accession from happening. In fact, Konstantinidis (11) found it paradoxical that “the military’s actions are justified on the grounds of the protection of the Kemalist principles, even though westernization, as envisaged by Atatürk, entailed the subordination of the military to civilians.”
Private – and Public – Reverence
It is interesting to note the degree to which Kemalism is promoted through the Turkish education system, and how as a result, it is ingrained into the minds of even the youngest citizens. For instance, Kinzer describes how a young Turkish boy, when asked to write an essay about love by his third-grade teacher, wrote that, “Love means love for Atatürk. Love means love for Atatürk’s mother… Love means love for Atatürk’s father” (35). Evidently, as the above example illustrates, reverence for Atatürk is cultivated at a young age in Turkey – a phenomenon that could explain how extreme, nationalist views are passed on from generation to generation, all in the name of Kemalism. Kinzer summarized (35):
By instinctively associating the deepest human emotion with the person of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, this young boy showed how fully he had already absorbed the holy creed of the Turks. According to its constitution, Turkey is a secular state with no official religion. But the truth is that Turks profess, and must profess, a highly developed faith enveloping and defining every aspect of their lives. It is the cult of Atatürk, founder of the Turkish Republic and now a virtual deity.
Still, the worship of Atatürk and his ideas is not only taught in schools or at home; it is also professed and safeguarded in Turkey’s very own legal system. Most notably, Article 301 of the Turkish Criminal Code “penalizes insulting ‘Turkishness,’ the Republic and the organs and institutions of the state” and “the restrictive jurisprudence established in 2006 by the court of Cassation on the article 301 remains in force” in Turkey (Progress Report 15). Ultimately, in line with Article 301, countless individuals within Turkey have been prosecuted, and some violently attacked or killed, for publicly criticizing an aspect of Turkish society or worse still, Atatürk himself.
For instance, in January 2008, a Turkish professor was sentenced to 15 months in prison (a sentence that was later suspended) for criticizing Atatürk. Atilla Yayla, who presently teaches at Buckingham University in England, said at a conference on Turkey and the European Union in 2006 that “the years in which Atatürk imposed his secular revolution were not as progressive as Turks are taught to believe” and “questioned the near-monopoly that Atatürk has on public statues and portraits.” (“Turkey’s Crumbling Dream”)
That same year, a Turkish woman named Nuray Bezirgan went on the country’s Teke Tek television program in June and said, “Are we allowed to not love Atatürk? If I’m not going to get in trouble, then no, I don’t,” when asked if she loved the founder of the Republic, as reported by the Turkish Daily News. (“Trouble for girl”) “When Atatürk received his authority from the Sultan, I don’t think he was given it to create a secular republic. If people are oppressing me in the name of Kemalism, then you can’t expect me to like Atatürk,” Berzirgan, who wears a headscarf, added. (“Trouble for Girl”)
The woman, the Turkish Daily news reported, may face close to five years in prison in accordance with a Turkish Penal Code’s law concerning crimes committed against Atatürk. Numbered 5816 and adopted on 25 July 1951, it states that, “anyone who publicly insults or curses the memory of Atatürk shall be imprisoned with a heavy sentence of between one and three years,” and that “if the crimes outlined are committed publicly will have the penalty imposed increased by a proportion of one-half.” (Human Rights Watch “List”) The law also states that anyone who defaces or breaks a statue or the grave of Atatürk will face up to five years in prison. (HRW “List”)
Lastly, and even more unsettling than the last two examples, is the 2007 murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink outside his Istanbul office. “Dink’s killing was apparently politically and ethnically motivated; he was identified by his murderers as an Armenian who had been convicted in court for ‘insulting Turkishness,’” wrote Human Rights Watch (“Dink’s killing”) in 2008. Indeed, prior to his death, Dink was convicted under Article 301 for “using the term ‘genocide’ in a statement made to Reuters news agency to describe the massacres of Armenians in Anatolia at the end of the Ottoman Empire.” (“Dink’s killing”) His 17-year-old killer was appointed by an armed gang of nationalist youth who had been sending Dink death threats for a period of 18 months prior to the shooting, HRW reported. The article also explained that the gang was primarily motivated by nationalism and a desire to protect Atatürk’s secular state (“Dink’s killing”).
The above-mentioned examples point to a Turkish society that is using Atatürk’s ideals and institutions to further their authoritarian and oppressive goals today. Once again, secularism is being placed above all else, and thus democracy and freedom of speech have been replaced by senseless violence, all in the name of Atatürk’s Kemalist ideology. Turkish Muslim columnist Mustafa Akyol wrote (“Meet the Monster”):
Some elements of the media, along with some pundits, bureaucrats and politicians, systematically spread the fear that Turkey is facing existential threats. Kurds, Armenians, Jews, Greeks, missionaries, non-nationalist Muslims — anybody who falls outside the narrow definition of a “good Turk” — are all seen as “internal enemies,” who are in bed with the external ones — the Europeans, the Americans, Iraqi Kurds, and, actually, the whole world. The militant who killed Dink is the product of this popular hysteria. Unless we accept this bitter fact and start to think seriously about our internal fascism, it is likely that Turkey will produce more of them.
Ultimately, as stated in an August 2007 International Crisis Group report (ii), Turkey can only expect to join the European Union as soon as 2017. And do to so, it will have to make some serious changes, including most notably, “resum(ing) with real commitment the reform process aimed at adapting Turkish laws to EU norms, particularly removing Article 301 of the penal code or redrafting it in a way that prevents its use in a manner incompatible with EU norms,” and “us(ing) the mandate from the Turkish electorate to build a strong, pro-reform political consensus that can marginalize secularist and nationalist scaremongers.” (ii)
Atatürk’s Ultimate Legacy
“A man may die, nations may rise and fall, but an idea lives on.” (Quote World) Those words, uttered by former U. S. President John F. Kennedy, ring particularly true in the case of Turkey and its indisputable leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. For not only have Atatürk’s ideas lived on decades after his death, but they have continued to influence virtually every aspect of Turkish society, from politics and the military, to religion and social customs. And in the eyes of most Turks and countless others worldwide, his reforms stand the test of time as examples of courage, idealism and unfettered determination.
Still, in today’s Turkey, Atatürk’s rhetoric and amendments have created a nation of extreme nationalists who, upon viewing a threat to their secular state, are prepared to use force to protect it. Violence, legal persecution and ostracism are merely a few of the methods used to ensure that Turkish secularism is preserved, and ironically, democracy maintained. By allowing the Turkish Armed Forces to intervene in the country’s democratic political process, democracy itself suffers, and the country caught between East and West is hurting its chances to join the European Union.
In the end, Atatürk’s major legacy to the people of Turkey is the institutions he created to ensure that secular principles and priorities were not only protected by the country’s official Constitution, but ingrained within the minds of Turkish citizens as well. He created a country wherein violence is permissible if it’s to safeguard secularism, wherein the democratic process can be pushed aside on a whim, and ultimately, wherein the ends can always justify the means. Still, that is not to say that the dangerous road down which Atatürk’s legacy has turned can’t be changed. In fact, Tirman (3) argues that, “one can say that Kemalism will ultimately lose its power,” and concludes that the present-day situation of violence and corruption “indicates how tenuous Atatürk’s legacy may be; how easily it may disassemble with the right combination of charismatic leadership and the internal will to change.”
Ultimately, those two things – charismatic leadership and a will to change – are what turned Mustafa Kemal Atatürk into the legend he is today. And, in light of the hot bed of conflict and oppression that is Turkish society today, it seems only fitting that those two things are what can remedy the situation, once and for all.
