The Cold War was a time of uncertainty and doubt for individuals and governments on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. And while this 40-year period was characterized by a constant and seemingly imminent threat, both the West and East were able to focus their energies on balancing each other’s influence, and assessing each other’s actions and power in the easily defined bipolar world. Thus, with the end of the Cold War, and the subsequent fall of the USSR and communism, came a new sense of uncertainty: who would replace the Soviet Union as the West’s counterpoint? And as the only remaining superpower, how would the United States deal with new, innovative security threats emanating from numerous locations across the globe?

Still, not only were countries, governments and the lives of individuals around the world changed at the end of the Cold War, but the international spectrum was also altered beyond recognition. And, perhaps the most interesting question emerged as a result: how would the trans-Atlantic relationship, and its main proponent The North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), be impacted by the fall of communism? And more specifically, how would NATO proceed now that its mandate – to counter the USSR and contain the spread of communism – had been accomplished? Now close to 20 years after the fall of the Berlin wall, the role of NATO in international politics is as ambiguous as ever, and has sparked an endless debate between intellectuals, politicians and even NATO member-states themselves. As such, the following paper will examine the beginnings of the organization, its mandate as it pertains to the ever-changing international landscape, and its successes and failures to date, and will argue that since the fall of communism, NATO no longer serves an essential purpose internationally, but only furthers American interests and actions worldwide.

NATO was created in 1949 in an attempt to contain the USSR, the Soviets’ growing international influence and the spread of communism. Led by the United States, NATO was seen as a tremendous success in that it was able to bring Western, like-minded states together to act as a unified force to counter communism during the Cold War. Interestingly, by promoting NATO membership in Western Europe, the US took itself from its policy of isolationism to one of containment (of communism), and as such, the organization “represents a revolutionary change in US foreign policy and the creation of America’s most entangling of alliances.” Yet even before NATO came into existence, Western states (in Europe in particular) had begun assessing the Soviet threat, and found it necessary to create a coalition to protect them from a possible attack. As such, Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg formed the Western European Union (WEU) as a result of the 1948 Treaty on Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defense, otherwise known as the Brussels Treaty.  The Treaty highlighted its signatories’ common political and social priorities, and affirmed their commitment to mutually defend each other should one be attacked in Europe. Most importantly, however, “by demonstrating their resolve to work together, the Brussels Treaty powers helped to overcome the reluctance of the United States to participate in the nascent European security arrangements,”  and thereby, as previously mentioned, come out of isolationism.

Indeed, shortly after the European states demonstrated their need (and desire) for a system of mutual defense, the United States and Canada joined the talks, and on 4 April 1949 in Washington, D.C., the North-Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was born. Twelve states joined NATO in 1949: the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Turkey and Greece joined in 1952 and Western Germany followed suit in 1954, prompting the USSR, fearful that the Germans would take control of US nuclear weapons and target their territory, to create the Warsaw Pact. The Soviets’ alternative to NATO, the Warsaw Pact mirrored NATO’s basic idea – to create a network of like-minded states that would mutually protect each other in case of attack – yet was instead comprised of Eastern, mainly Soviet-occupied and therefore communist states including Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. And, a major difference between the two bodies was that “NATO – unlike the Warsaw Pact – rested on its members’ free consent, even that of the weakest,”  while Warsaw Pact member-states participated primarily because they were occupied, and thereby controlled, by the Soviets.

Ultimately, by joining NATO on their own freewill, the member-states agreed to abide by the organization’s Charter, named the Washington Treaty, which includes 14 articles, none more important than the fifth. Article 5 states that all NATO members will perceive an attack against one of the member-states in North America or Europe as an attack against them all, and therefore, they will take “such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”  While this main proponent of NATO has a seemingly honorable raison d’être, today it serves as a seemingly legitimate reason for the US to pursue its interests around the globe. Indeed, Article 5 can be used by any NATO member-state to justify taking military action, so long as a threat is perceived; US President George W. Bush enforced Article 5 after the 9/11 attacks in order to wage war in Afghanistan. And in order to mount military campaigns that can effectively respond to the realities of today’s world, such as fighting insurgents in Afghanistan, NATO created the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) in 1993 in order to “prepare better-integrated groups of multinational forces,”  and make NATO assets available to the member-states that need them for peacekeeping, humanitarian relief or collective defense purposes. Further, the CJTF “will be augmented from other NATO headquarters and by nations and contributing Partner countries as necessary, using a modular approach, in order to meet the requirements of the specific mission.”

Still, in order to decide when, where and under what circumstances NATO troops should be deployed, NATO member-states must come to a consensus. Therefore, unlike decisions made at the United Nations Security Council or General Assembly, NATO decisions are not voted upon, and are instead the product of a long process of discussion, consultation and bargaining between the members, and involves NATO’s highest decision-making body, the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The NAC is comprised of all NATO member-states, which are represented on three different levels – permanent (Permanent Representatives/Ambassadors), ministerial (Foreign and/or Defense Ministers) and summit (Heads of State and governments)  – and is supported by numerous committees including a Military Committee, Joint Committee on Proliferation and Political Committee, among others.  And ultimately, “this means that when a “NATO decision” is announced, it is the expression of the collective will of all the sovereign states that are members of the Alliance.”  Still, such decisions do not come easily, and the process won’t become easier in the future now that 26 countries are now members of the organization. “It may become tricky to preserves its necessary cohesion; any single member, for internal political or any other reasons, could potentially prevent the Alliance from acting or evolving.”

Still, from the very beginning, “NATO has been an organization that has been asked to do too much, with too little, with members from very different strategic backgrounds and cultures.”  And while NATO member countries are considered equal, NATO has always been and will continue to be an American-led organization. Indeed, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to US President Jimmy Carter, the United States has, and continues to, use NATO as a means through which it can cement its presence in Europe indefinitely. “NATO provides not only the main mechanism for the exercise of U.S. influence regarding European matters but the basis for the politically critical American military presence in Western Europe.”  There has existed – and continues to exist – a huge gap between the NATO member-states in terms of power and status – “with the United States on the one extreme of the spectrum, and Norway and Iceland on the other.”  This has, of course, resulted in numerous problems since its inception, none more pronounced than France’s withdrawal “from NATO’s military command as a result of General de Gaulle’s disagreements with Washington,” and more importantly, a fundamental disagreement with the US-led structure of the organization.  Further, the issue of burden-sharing has caused tangible tension within the Alliance, with Americans and Europeans pointing fingers at each other in terms of who contributes what. Yet in the end, despite the petty bickering, it is obvious that “if Europeans resent Washington’s attempts to impose its leadership on its allies without flexibility, and Americans resent Europe’s failure to spend more on its own defense or support the US in regions such as East Asia or the Persian Gulf, NATO will suffer.”

It is also important to mention that the issue of burden-sharing came to a head in the early 1990s, when “it seemed to many in Europe and North America that the time had come for a rebalancing of the relationship between the two sides of the Atlantic and for concrete steps to be taken by the European member countries to assume greater responsibility for their common security and defence.”  As a result of ongoing tension, The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI, one of NATO’s most important initiatives) took shape, in an effort to get European states more involved – and give them the necessary resources and tools needed – in the defense of their own territory and interests. Further, by giving the European member-states access to NATO military planning capabilities, NATO hopes the European Union itself will become more secure, not to mention more open to a friendly, open relationship with its allies across the Atlantic.  “Where NATO takes the lead, Europe will carry a fairer share of the burden. Where NATO, as a whole, is not engaged, Europe will have the capacity to take the lead. This means that North America won’t have to become directly involved, through NATO, in every security crisis in the neighborhood simply because Europe can’t handle it. ESDI makes sense,” said former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson in 2000.  Still, some argue that ESDI would further divide the Alliance, giving as how its European members would no longer need the United States for support. Yet, if the organization’s enlargement in the last decade is any indication, NATO’s break-up seems to be a far-off notion, to say the least.

In fact, shortly after the fall of communism, the Baltic States – Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – became geopolitically important for the United States. Yet Kent R. Meyer, US Army Claims Commander, warned in 2000 that the possibility of welcoming the Baltic countries into the Alliance (they formally joined in 2004) wasn’t beneficial to the organization itself. “Article 5 of the NATO Charter should serve as a clear reminder that NATO is not a club but a military alliance,” he wrote in a Le Monde Diplomatique article.  “In the [US] Administration’s efforts to convince us that we must expand NATO to create a new Europe without lines, it forgets that military alliances are all about lines—lines that separate the territory that alliance members are sworn to defend from those areas that the members have no obligation to defend.” Still, since that time, the Partnership for Peace (PfP), a new program to better help certain states ascend to full-member status within the organization, was created. Formally, it is a “security agreement that will facilitate the exchange of classified information”  between the state in question and NATO, and today is the preamble to membership. Further, states entering into the PfP agreement must make “a number of far-reaching political commitments to preserve democratic societies; to maintain the principles of international law; to fulfill obligations under the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act and international disarmament and arms control agreements; to refrain from the threat or use of force against other states; to respect existing borders; and to settle disputes peacefully.”

Today, it is argued that the PfP model needs to be augmented, thereby “placing NATO at the center of a global network of partnerships, to afford NATO forces more security, capacity and, all-important, regional legitimacy.”   In fact, NATO’s Charter “states that NATO is open to any European state willing to adopt the principles of the treaty and to contribute to the collective security of the region.”  In other words, by making sure that NATO membership, preceded by PfP status, is only given to countries that agree with the American way of life and its definitions of democracy, the US has ensured its control of the organization. Adamant opposition to Russia has been, if one examines NATO expansion within the last ten years, a major selling point for new membership, however in October 2008 NATO and Serbia, one of Russia’s longstanding allies, signed a PfP agreement. Further, recent developments suggest that Serbia (and Georgia) will likely join NATO in the near future, not to mention may bypass the normally required steps needed for membership.  This, therefore, signals the increasingly bold steps taken by NATO to expand its reach, and forces Russian officials to wonder how far it will truly go, and how much influence it will lose as a result.

Indeed, NATO now encompasses 26 countries, including nine former Warsaw Pact members. And as previously mentioned, since the fall of communism, NATO membership has begun stretching further and further East, engulfing many of Russia’s formerly occupied territories, including most importantly Poland and the Czech Republic. These countries had to conform to NATO’s Membership Action Plan (MAP), launched in 1999, which provides “advice, assistance and practical support on all aspects of NATO membership” to states that wish to join the Alliance.  Russia, for its part, hasn’t been overly keen on NATO expansion, especially in light of losing its sphere of influence as a result. Not only that, but “under the cover of the war in Afghanistan, the US has established what are clearly designed as long-term bases in Uzbekistan and Kirghizstan, obtained military facilities in Tadzhikistan and Kazakhstan, and even extended its tentacles as far as Georgia.”  Thus, it is no surprise that recent plans to build missile defense systems in Slupsk in northern Poland and in the Brdy region of the Czech Republic, just outside of Prague, has only added fuel to the fire, and has ignited a firestorm of controversy – and tough Russian rhetoric – directed at Europe and the United States.

“I have every reason to say that there are no [intercontinental ballistic missiles] in Iran or North Korea, nor are there going to be any [in the foreseeable future]. So the real question is, against what countries will this system be used?” asked former Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov in December 2006 about NATO plans.  This skepticism on the part of Russia should, however, come as no real surprise, considering the fact that “historically, a fundamental objective of Russian national strategy has been to ensure that a buffer of weak nations, held firmly within the Russian sphere of influence, protected their frontiers.”  Still, Russian threats (placing their own missiles in Kaliningrad, attacking the NATO bases, etc.) only fueled Poland and the Czech Republic’s desire to become involved: “[Russia’s] increasingly shrill and occasionally threatening reactions to the aspirations of the Central Europeans merely intensified the determination of the former satellite states – mindful of their only recently achieved liberation from Russian rule – to gave the safe haven of NATO.”  In fact, not only have these formerly occupied countries pushed for NATO membership; they have wholeheartedly embraced the West in virtually all aspects of life. “[Poles] like the [American] style of life; rags to riches and zero to hero. The United States has never let us down. It was the natural choice [to align with the US]. Poland is gradually becoming a Western oriented country,” Bartosz Wisniewski, an analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs, said in April 2008.

Ultimately, NATO’s missile defense system, said to protect its member-states against rogue states such as Iran and North Korea, demonstrates the expansion of its mandate to beyond its own territory. Indeed, many of the threats perceived by NATO members to their national and common security are located outside the treaty area, and “require new political tools and military capabilities to combat them.”  For instance, NATO’s role in two bloodied Yugoslavian civil conflicts in the 1990s is a prime example of the organization stepping outside its immediate boundaries to intervene militarily. In 1995, during the United Nations mandated Operation Deliberate Force, NATO dropped approximately 3515 bombs on Serbia,  and was deemed “the largest and most complex operation NATO has ever undertaken, a mission to help bring peace and stability to Bosnia and Herzegovina,” by NATO Defense Ministers.  Still, what occurred in Kosovo in 1999, and constituted NATO’s only real war effort at the time, is an even more contentious issue, seeing as how countless civilians were not only displaced, but also killed, as a result of NATO involvement. Indeed, according to Human Rights Watch, NATO bombs killed approximately 500 civilians between March and June 1999.

After a slew of diplomatic and UN-led sanctions against Slobodan Milosevic’s Serbian government proved unfruitful at the time, a decision was made by the NATO member-states to take direct military action in Kosovo. “By May 1999, 90 per cent of all ethnic Albanians had been expelled from their homes in Kosovo – about 900,000 fled across Kosovo’s borders and more than 500,000 were refugees inside Kosovo.”  While whether their intervention was necessary to stop ethnic cleansing in Kosovo remains debatable, the means – air strikes and bombings near, or directly in, civilian areas – used by NATO have faced harsh criticism, and duly so. “So now we have a million refugees, and NATO has been caught with its collective trousers down,” wrote The Guardian (UK) columnist Derek Brown in April 1999. “Robin Cook [British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1997-2001] wants us to believe that long before NATO launched its air strikes, Slobodan Milosevic was carefully planning the ethnic cleansing of the Kosovar Albanians. So why didn’t NATO do something about it? Why were there no emergency stockpiles of tents and food and medical supplies? Why, above all, did we not intervene militarily?”

“The argument that, because of humanitarian concerns for the refugees, we were forced to act is not plausible. Our efforts dramatically increased the refugee problem,” said US Senator Ron Paul in 1999 before the US Congress.  Further, NATO’s involvement in the region didn’t end with the last dropped bomb – instead, 15,000 allied forces have been stationed in Kosovo since June 1999. Initially, troops were implanted in the region to protect against another breakout of ethnic fighting, and today, its goal remains a peacekeeping one, and involves the return of displaced citizens to their homes, providing medical assistance and rebuilding the infrastructure of an area entirely torn apart by war.  Still, according to Ron Paul, NATO’s sustained presence in Kosovo isn’t a good thing. “In the effort to expand NATO and promote internationalism, we see in reaction the rise of ugly nationalism. The U.S. and NATO policy of threats and intimidation to establish an autonomous Kosovo without true independence from Serbia, and protected by NATO’s forces for the foreseeable future, has been a recipe for disaster. This policy of nation-building and interference in a civil war totally contradicts the mission of European defense set out in the NATO charter,” he said.

In fact, NATO’s involvement in Kosovo was brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2004, which eventually ruled that it did not have the jurisdiction to make a legally binding judgment. Serbia and Montenegro argued that NATO’s 1999 bombing campaign violated international law, while the defendants, the NATO member-states, reiterated the idea that “their action was justified by what they said was Belgrade’s ethnic cleansing of Kosovo’s majority ethnic Albanian population.”  Ultimately, while no decision was made, the damage to NATO’s reputation was done. And yet according to former NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, there was no other alternative. “So with 20-20 hindsight, knowing what we knew then and what we know now, I am proud that NATO took action in Kosovo. It was not only the right thing to do — it was the only thing to do,” he said in 2000.  Still, if anything, NATO’s practices in Kosovo have done one thing: placed added pressure on its new offensive military mission today in Afghanistan. Indeed, in keeping with this new mandate that extends beyond the Alliance’s borders, the 9/11 attacks proved that “given the nature and the source of the challenge, NATO must go global.”  In fact, the attacks on the World Trade Centers only cemented this new need to move beyond NATO’s own boundaries in order to effectively respond to the changing nature of security threats, many of which, as the near total destruction of downtown Manhattan demonstrated, originate abroad. The mission in Afghanistan is, in fact, the first time that NATO has entered into a military operation outside North American or European territory, and its success will greatly impact the cohesion and future of the transatlantic alliance. All eyes are watching, and the US, EU and NATO are all keenly aware of that fact.

NATO forced joined the war in Afghanistan in 2003, and presently, it is being fought on two fronts: Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) led by the US against the Taliban and al-Quaeda network, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) led by a majority of troops from NATO’s 26 member-states. The ISAF was created as a result of UN Security Council Resolution 1386, passed on December 20, 2001, and includes 11 specific elements related to the ISAF mission within the country.  More specifically, Resolution 1386 states that the ISAF must “assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul and its surrounding areas, calls upon Member States to contribute personnel, equipment and other resources to the ISAF, and authorizes the Member States participating in the ISAF to take all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate.”

Presently, American, Canadian, British and Dutch forces are in the eastern and southern, and most volatile, regions of Afghanistan. Due to heightened danger in this region of the country, the countries fighting therein have been highly critical of the remaining NATO member-states who, while participating in the war, have chosen to remain in less hostile areas. For instance, while Germany has contributed 3,000 troops to the war effort, most are deployed in a northern, far less dangerous, area of Afghanistan. “German troops reportedly patrol only in armored personnel carriers, and do not leave their bases at night. This has led some to suggest that the implementation of excess force protection measures by the Germans has made their work, even in a safe area, far less effective.”  Ultimately, while NATO agreed to participate in the war effort in Afghanistan, which states will send troops (how many, and to what region of the country) remains an extremely contentious issue that won’t be resolved, it seems, in the near future. “Allies with forces in harm’s way continued to criticize other allies that will not send combat forces or commit to areas where the Taliban are active.”

Right now, despite having the fact that the member-states have pledged to contribute more troops and ground forces, “the upturn in violence in 2007 and 2008 led U.S. and NATO commanders in Afghanistan to conclude that they needed about three more brigades (10,000 troops) to be able to stabilize the still restive southern sector.”  Ultimately, the war in Afghanistan is a long-term military effort with no end in sight, and as such, it is truly a test for NATO to prove that it can sustain a military effort and come out victorious. Indeed, especially after its questionable practices and decisions during the 1999 war in Kosovo, NATO’s very existence, not to mention the viability of American leadership within the organization, rests on the outcome of Afghanistan. “The allies believe that the success of the mission will also be a test of the United States’ ability and commitment to lead NATO, even if they do not always agree with every element of U.S. policy in the country. The ultimate outcome of NATO’s effort to stabilize Afghanistan and U.S. leadership of that effort may well affect the cohesiveness of the alliance and Washington’s ability to shape NATO’s future.”

On a deeper level, it can be argued that NATO is being used by the US as a means to grant legitimacy to its otherwise questionable military missions around the world. Most notably, in 2003, the US attempted to get the go-ahead from NATO for an aspect related to the war in Iraq. Instead, Belgium, France and Germany denied the US from implanting “defensive equipment for Turkey in anticipation of a possible war against Iraq” and prompted a slew of articles questioning the future of the organization. Indeed, tension within NATO combined with German, Russian and French insistence at the United Nations Security Council for more time to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq pending the invasion, “fractured longtime allies on the even of an increasingly likely conflict in the Persian Gulf region.”  Some even argue that NATO’s mission in Afghanistan was merely a way for the US to gain control of the military capabilities and manpower of the member-states, thereby “transforming the European members of the Atlantic Alliance, most of them member states of the EU, into auxiliaries to assist the US armed forces in worldwide imperial expansion.”

According to neo-conservative American scholar Robert Kagan, a shift in the cohesiveness of the transatlantic relationship could be seen as early as 1990, and “the underlying cause was simple: the allies did not need one another as much as before. The impulse to cooperate during the Cold War had been one part enlightened virtue and three parts cold necessity. Mutual dependence, not mutual affection, had been the bedrock of the alliance. When the Soviet threat disappeared, the two sides were free to go their own ways.”  Indeed, nearly 60 years after its creation, and with its goal of countering communism accomplished, one may wonder why “if the Atlantic Alliance was primarily a tool for winning the Cold War, why not just declare victory and let the Alliance fade?”  That very question has plagued academics and governments since 1990, and sparked debate in virtually all corners of the globe. Still, the most obvious answer to such a query is simple: NATO should just fade away since in the meantime it is parading around the international spectrum as a hollow replica of what it once was, growing exponentially with no specific purpose in sight.

Still, “many challenges to shared US and European interests remain, and common culture and values, while not a sufficient condition for partnership, will continue to create a bias towards transatlantic cooperation.”  And, while NATO still struggles to find real purpose in today’s world, it will most likely remain an active international decision-making body, if only for the sake of Western ideology and tradition. “Its preservation is vital to the transatlantic connection. On this issue, there is overwhelming American-European consensus. Without NATO, Europe would not only become vulnerable but almost immediately would become politically fragmented as well.”  Further, NATO is a unique military organization and it would be foolish to disregard the important political, social and military structures it has created in the last 50 years. “So long as it is plausible that European and US forces might be called upon to undertake military tasks together – and they keep having to do so, from the Persian Gulf to the Balkans – it makes sense to preserve an integrated command structure and shared assets.”

Ultimately, the merits of NATO can be judged by its contribution to the fall of communism, its – to be frank – botched intervention in Kosovo in 1999, its expansion Eastwards, Russian-provoking policy of missile defense, and its currently contentious mission in Afghanistan.  And while the organization’s major success – helping bring an end to the Cold War – will not soon be forgotten, it may become eclipsed if the present war in Afghanistan continues along the same beaten and controversial path it presently is on.  But in the end, despite the organization’s many ups and downs, successes and failures, it seems that NATO will remain a prevalent force in international relations for many years to come; so long as the United States continues to view it as a organization that can further its interests and give it the semblance of international legitimacy, that is.

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how responding to children throwing rocks at armored cars by shooting live rounds/missiles at said children makes any sense whatsoever?

currently reading: Israel-Palestine on Record – How the New York Times Misreports Conflict in the Middle East

I was reading an International Herald Tribune article today when a particular passage caught my attention. It described U.S.-led peace negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians, and according to U.S. Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice, “neither Israelis nor Palestinians had fully lived up to their obligations. Israel is supposed to end all settlement building and remove illegal settlement outposts, while the Palestinians are supposed to dismantle terrorist infrastructures.”

…Terrorist infrastructures? By this, did she mean Hamas? And if so, how does one truly define a terrorist organization? A group that defends its people? A group that stands up against its oppressors and says enough? Or does it come down to the number of innocent casualties incurred by the group’s actions? Or most importantly, how those innocent casualties come about, because we all know that a suicide bombing that kills ten is deemed more atrocious than a precise missile that kills 100?**

Dictionary.com defines terrorism as “the use of violence and threats to intimidate or coerce, esp. for political purposes.” But according to this definition, wouldn’t Rice herself be a member of a terrorist organization, the U.S. government? Couldn’t Israeli refusal to halt all settlement activity be perceived as a terrorist act, seeing as how such settlements not only undermine international law, but intimidate Palestinian civilians in the West Bank?

It’s funny (well, not actually ha-ha funny, more disturbing than anything else) how we deem groups terrorist organizations without so much as understanding their motives or reasoning. That is not to say that attacks on civilians are ever warranted or shouldn’t be taken seriously, but I wouldn’t be surprised to see more civilians casualties at the hands of American or Israeli armies than by Palestinian suicide-bombers or Hamas’ acts of “terrorism.”

It’s also interesting to note that Nelson Mandela, now viewed as a symbol of peace, courage and determination worldwide, was considered a terrorist (as a member of the African National Congress that fought against South African apartheid). In fact, as of July 2008, Mandela was still on the U.S.’s terrorism watch list.

**I don’t believe that we can, or should, put a price on human suffering in any instance. In this way, the last question was merely to prove the point that actions by non-governmental groups are often deemed evil, whereas the same actions propagated by governments are instead viewed as necessary.

It’s always dangerous to paint something one sole color. People, places, ideas… much, if not all, in life is multifaceted, not one dimensional. With this in mind, I was happy to come across The Other Israel, an anthology of essays written by Israeli journalists, politicians, scholars and others, in a local used bookstore.

The book’s subtitle, Voices of Refusal and Dissent, alludes to what its pages contain: critiques, criticism and arguments condemning the treatment of Palestinians under Israeli occupation. And what makes these texts so different from the ones I’ve read (that in essence express the same ideas) is that this time the authors are Israelis themselves. Israelis who are just as patriotic as most, love their country just as much – if not more – than most, and who believe in democracy and human rights above all else.

“Whoever claims that the settlements are Israel’s catastrophe from a security and economic point of view is not an anti-Semite but a patriot. Whoever says that this (Ariel Sharon) government is committing crimes against humanity is not an anti-Semite but an honest and humane person. Whoever condemns the demolition of houses in Rafah and Jerusalem, opposes the provocative liquidations and fostering of ferment in the area so that we can avoid going to the negotiating table, does so out of love for their homeland,” wrote Shulamit Aloni, an Israeli politician and prominent member of the Israeli peace camp.

Indeed, a major problem within Israel today is the inability of Israeli Jews to objectively assess what their government is doing in their name. Are house demolitions that leave hundreds of Palestinians homeless literally overnight truly necessary? Do they honestly believe that constant humiliation, persecution and controls of Arab Israelis will put an end to the terror attacks utilized by disheartened and frustrated Palestinians, or instead add fuel to the fire?

Ultimately, The Other Israel makes me feel less alone in my desire to be critical of Israeli practices as a Jewish person. It makes me realize that the only way to help both Israelis and Palestinians, and bring peace to the region, is to voice my opposition. My tool? Words. And although to most, they seem far less effective than missiles, rockets or gun-power, they’re all I have.

“The Arabs have a saying for this: The dogs bark and the convoy marches on. Why, then, do we bark? I suppose that as professional writers most of us believe in the power of words to create a better, more just society, to diminish the wrongs and the violence. We believe in the power of words, at least to a certain extent, because most of us have no other means,” wrote Tom Seguev, a columnist at Israel’s Ha’aretz daily newspaper.

Moving Beyond Blind Acceptance

A month ago, I told a family friend that I hoped to one day volunteer in the Public Relations department at An-Najah University in Nablus, Palestine. My goal would be to bring awareness to the plight and suffering of the Palestinians in the West Bank through research, writing and producing web content for the University, I explained. My friend interrupted me. “It’s not Palestine – it’s the occupied territories,” he said. “And it’s too dangerous for you to go there. You’re Jewish.”

My response? “I don’t look Jewish.” Sure, it was an immature answer in light of his grotesquely smug and condescending statement, but I wanted to avoid a confrontation, to be entirely honest. And I knew that whatever arguments I came up with would be rebuffed: My friend is Jewish, and to him, that equates with being entirely, 100%, supportive of Israel.

It frustrates me that otherwise intelligent individuals are so willing to forgo critical thinking based on their religious beliefs. How can Jewish people today – the majority of whom have direct links to the pain and suffering brought about during the Holocaust – blindly support the state of Israel in its oppressive and cruel treatment of the Palestinians?

I’m not saying that individuals shouldn’t support Israel in any shape or form; the state of Israel has a clear right to exist within its UN mandated 1948 boundaries. But to blindly support all Israeli actions since its creation 60 years ago, without so much as an inkling that maybe Israelis have gone from being the victims to the abusers, is shameful.

Open your eyes. Check your personal bias at the door. See both sides of the issues. Use a variety of sources. Read, study, learn – objectively. And then, if you still support today’s Israel, fine. At least you’ll know what topics, events and fundamental issues you’re backing.

And if you realize that maybe Israel doesn’t deserve your full-fledged support, be brave enough to stand up and be heard, just as the individuals in The Other Israel have. Their voices of dissent and refusal indeed prove that not all Israelis, not all Jews, support Israel’s apartheid regime, and instead value democracy, human rights and international law. And ultimately, by voicing their opposition, they have done much more to help Israel than blind and uninformed support ever could.

Alicia Hubbard steps to the center of the burgundy mat in early August. Tying her long black hair into a loose bun on top of her head, she sizes up the competition: a teenage boy who is about three inches taller.

The whistle blows, and her male opponent, Nico Gasparrini, quickly puts the 5-foot-3 Hubbard in a headlock and pins her to the mat. Moments later, Hubbard is down once again, but this time, she has her arms and legs squeezed tightly around her challenger’s ankles and neck.

The whistle sounds for the final time, and Hubbard, having released her grip, now skips around the Springfield gymnasium, smiling from ear to ear.

“I feel pretty proud,” says the 21-year-old wrestler from Northampton. “We train with guys, and that’s hard. I think if I can beat a guy at my weight, I can beat any woman at my weight.”

Hubbard is one of 20 wrestlers – including two other women – training at Springfield Technical Community College as part of the New England All-Stars Wrestling Club. It is led by Anibal Nieves, a former Olympian and Pan American Games medal winner who is the wrestling coach at Western New England College in Springfield. (See related story)

“Alicia has what good-quality wrestlers have, and that’s heart,” Nieves says. “She actually believes that she can do something with (wrestling) and that’s why I’m dedicated to her.”

Hubbard, who graduated from Northampton High School in 2005, says her goal is to reach the 2012 Olympics – though she readily admits there is a long way to go before that dream can become a reality.

“I have to take baby steps,” she says. “The key for me is just a lot of experience: as many matches as possible, as many international tournaments as possible.”

The Beijing Olympics are the second at which women’s wrestling is a competitive sport. Female wrestlers from 30 different countries are vying for gold medals, which will be awarded in four weight classes today and Sunday.

Hubbard competes in the 121-pound (55 kilos) weight class in freestyle, the style of wrestling most practiced by women and the one used in Olympic competition.

Hubbard began wrestling competitively during her senior year in high school, but did not seriously contemplate pursuing the sport professionally until a friend told her in the fall of 2006 that she could wrestle in Springfield.

“When I was in high school, soccer was my main focus,” says Hubbard, who also played lacrosse. However, tearing her anterior cruciate ligament during an off-season soccer game before her junior year in high school made her re-evaluate her athletic priorities.

“I always wanted to be at a really extreme level of competition,” she says. “Once I started wrestling, I saw what my potential was. I saw that maybe this was my green light; maybe it wasn’t soccer.”

‘A tenacity and a physicality’

Her father, Jamie Hubbard, a Buddhist studies professor at Smith College, said he never considered his daughter to be the best athlete among her peers.

“I always thought of Alicia as the 80 percenter, but with a tenacity and a physicality that made up for maybe not having the best move on the soccer ball, or whatever it was. She’d take you down. She has a physicality that’s intense,” he says.

And it was that physicality, combined with “a very hard work ethic,” that made Hubbard so well-suited to wrestling, says Byron Joy, who coached the sport at Northampton High her senior year.

“She would work harder in practice than some of the other guys on the team,” Joy says. “If you’re going to be a successful wrestler, you need to be able to take the whole experience in. And she was able to take everything as a learning experience.”

The only girl on the team in 2005, she “had the talent and the passion for the sport” to make up for her lack of familiarity with wrestling, says Joy.

Hubbard said she had to set aside concerns that male teammates might not take her seriously. “But I proved myself, and I think the boys respected that.”

Today, Hubbard wrestles women in competition who are mostly in their late 20s and early 30s. “I’m still very young. It’s intimidating, but it’s also inspiring,” she says.

Winning the Girls Massachusetts State Wrestling Tournament in March 2007 made her realize that “maybe it’s not so impossible to reach my goals.”

“It was my first tournament ever. It was my first gold medal ever. And that was my inspiration for saying, ‘I can do this. Look how far I’ve come,’” she says.

“The first time we went to see her first championship, I was surprised that the movements were even graceful,” recalls her mother, Maki Hubbard, a Japanese language professor at Smith College. “Of course there are rules and styles – and Alicia’s determined, vicious look – but also flow, timing, speed … It was exciting.”

Amber Wing is Hubbard’s practice partner at the All-Stars Wrestling Club. Wing says she is motivated to become better by working with someone so passionate about wrestling as Hubbard. “She’s the perfect partner. We spend a lot of time together, and we’re there to support one another.

“She goes hard all the time. She wants to go to the Olympics, so she puts a lot of time into (wrestling). Pretty much all the time she can, really,” Wing adds.

That has led Hubbard to compete as far away as Puerto Rico, Toronto and Las Vegas in the past year.

‘Best of two worlds’

Hubbard awakes at 6 a.m. each day to do cardio and weight-training workouts before heading to work. Between January and April, when she does most of her competitive wrestling, Hubbard also trains on the mat two or three times each day.

“They’re long days, but I get everything done,” she says. “It’s worth it in the end.”

Two hours before stepping onto the wrestling mat in Springfield earlier this month, Hubbard is wearing a pink dress, black flip-flops, and a long beaded necklace while massaging a client amidst facial cleansers, oils and various other beautifying products.

Hubbard graduated in January 2007 from the New England Center of Esthetic Education in Northampton and is now a licensed esthetician, working part time at Tranquility Day Spa in Florence.

She explains that “it’s the best of two worlds. It’s strange, but the two things that I love doing more than anything in my life are wrestling and esthetics. It’s a good balance.”

Her father, Jamie, says his daughter’s two major interests don’t surprise him in the slightest because “she likes unusual challenges.”

“I’ll make you beautiful, then I’ll beat you up,” he adds, laughing. “But it’s all about finding your bliss, and she seems to have discovered it.”

Still, Hubbard says she has to deal with finding financial support for the training she needs to wrestle at an advanced level, as well as overcoming persistent stereotypes about the sport.

“A lot of people think of huge, jacked women who are involved with men’s wrestling. That’s totally unrealistic,” she says. “It’s really upsetting because there’s so much great talent but it’s hard for girls to find training spaces and coaching.”

“I can’t say that when I was little I dreamt of the Olympics, because I didn’t,” Hubbard adds. “But now I can see it’s an attainable goal because there is that market for women’s wrestling. It’s also more confidence-boosting when you know that there’s an opportunity to be at the Olympic level.”

But for now, Hubbard is focused on her next challenge: the Sunkist Tournament in Arizona during October. It’s a chance, she says, to get noticed, secure a few sponsors and most importantly, get more experience.

“She’s grown a lot mentally and physically,” Nieves says. “And the key thing is we take it step by step. So far, so good.”

It is witnessed in virtually every nation worldwide, albeit in various forms and degrees. From the stars and stripes on every street corner July Fourth in the United States, to rallies in downtown Brussels to promote Belgian unity, nationalism is a widespread force with an admirable purpose: to create a sense of pride for one’s country or community, and learn to value that community’s cultural, social and political make-up. Still, despite its honorable raison d’être, not all strains of nationalism are positive, and in some instances, they incite violence, persecution and the loss of both personal and civil liberties.

Today, while nationalism is often used as the pretext for human rights violations and unlawful acts, it is most dangerous when incorporated within a political sphere of influence. In fact, the use of nationalism as a harmful political tool can clearly be seen in the case of Turkey, a country struggling between East and West, democracy and authoritarianism, and modern and traditional values. And almost ironically, it is the institutions of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the beloved founder and first President of the Turkish Republic who so badly wanted his country to become like its Western, democratic neighbors, which have preserved this misguided sense of nationalism close to 80 years after they were first instated.

“There is much to justify Turkey’s reverence for Atatürk. He is the force that allowed Turkey to rise form the ashes of defeat and emerge as a vibrant new nation. Without Atatürk’s vision, without his ambition and energy, without his astonishing boldness in sweeping away traditions accumulated over centuries, today’s Turkey would not exist and the world would be much poorer” (Kinzer 36). Indeed, Atatürk’s legacies to the Turkish state are the institutions he created, and the hope he spread throughout the country by means of his courageous reforms in the 1920s and ‘30s. Nonetheless, in today’s Turkish society, those institutions now succeed in promoting a sense of ultra-nationalism, and granting a lawful excuse for violent and oppressive acts.

The military’s ability to intervene in the democratic process, censorship of all dissident opinions or practices, and an ongoing debate on whether or not women should have access to government buildings or universities while wearing a headscarf are all examples of issues in Turkish society today that can be directly linked to Atatürk’s reforms. As such, despite having reached near-Godly stature in Turkey – with his dedicated following of worshipers and his own religion, Kemalism (Kinzer 35) – Atatürk’s true legacy is heavily influenced by the country’s present-day internal conflicts, and the extreme nationalism he has effectively allowed to flourish.

“Nationalism, in my opinion, is nothing more than an idealistic rationalization for militarism and aggression. Nationalism is an infantile disease. It is the measles of mankind,” said Albert Einstein (HeartQuotes). With this in mind, the following paper will analyze the way in which Atatürk’s reforms have preserved Turkish nationalism and the extreme violence, censorship and human rights violations that go along with it. Further, it will link Turkish nationalism and Kemalist ideologies to Turkey’s present-day bid for European Union membership, and how ironically, despite being the driving force behind the country’s Westernization, it may indeed be Atatürk’s reforms that have left EU accession talks at a standstill.

Secular Change

As Kinzer states, “trying to understand Turkey without understanding Atatürk would be like studying European history without considering Christianity” (36). Indeed, Atatürk’s place in the Turkish history books is not only substantial, but it also proves just how influential his reforms were in shaping the country. After being sworn in as President by the Grand National Assembly (which at the same time also declared Turkey to be a republic) on October 29, 1923, Atatürk immediately began implementing a vast slew of reforms that, at the time, seemed courageous to some, and outrageous to others. (Roskin and Coyle 128 ) For instance, in 1924, he “announced… the revival of a pure Islam untainted by politics,” and to do so, abolished the caliphate (the highest Muslim religious leader), the office of the Shaykh al-Islam and the Ministry of Religious Affairs. (Roskin and Coyle 128 ) Further, he replaced traditional Islamic law, Shari’a, with the Swiss civil code and mandated the use of the Latin alphabet instead of an Arabic/Ottoman one. (Roskin and Coyle 130)

Atatürk’s reforms also heavily influenced gender equality within the country. Those reforms, Janet Browning summarized (1), included making polygamy (and marriage without the consent of both partners) illegal, the equalization of inheritance rights between male and female heirs, the establishment of equal pay for equal work regardless of gender, and the right to vote and stand election in municipal and national elections for women. “Through constitutional, juridical and political reforms, through reform of the educational system and through his attacks on the prevailing ideology, he sought to accomplish changes in the superstructure, making inroads from all directions. Indeed, he was so determined that people would accept the changed social institutions that he was prepared to use force if necessary,” Browning states (2).

Still, by outlawing the headscarf in public (and inside all government buildings including most notably universities), Atatürk presented many Turkish women with a difficult ultimatum: whether or not wearing a headscarf was worth the sacrifice of not having an education, or living in fear of religious persecution. “Unlike America where secularism is separation of church and state, in Turkey (and many other lands) secularism means the subjugation of church to state,” Roskin and Coyle found (128 ). Indeed, “by attacking [the headscarf] Atatürk had made clear that he considered nothing sacred simply because it was long-established.” (Kinzer, 44) The debate surrounding the headscarf still rages throughout Turkish society today, with some viewing it as the expression of religious freedoms, and others as an example of religious symbols unnecessarily mixing into a supposedly secular state. And ultimately, this example demonstrates that “in [Atatürk’s] system, pluralism, personal freedom and individuality do not fit.” (Konstantinidis, 6)

Nonetheless, “Atatürk, indeed, had many other talents than simple power of imagination: not only had he the determination, but… a tremendous gift of timing and measuring what could be accomplished,” Artun Unsal reported (29). Still, some progressive Ottomans shared Atatürk’s vision for Turkey, and so the only difference between Atatürk and his predecessors then, was that Atatürk had the ability to make his reforms a reality whereas those before him were guilty of using empty rhetoric, Unsal found (29). “Atatürk was going to realize many of the ‘dreams’ of the progressive Ottomans. Evidently, Atatürk had the genius of realizing them, in contrast to others, who had only made statements in the best intellectual tradition.” (Unsal, 29) In fact, Kinzer wrote (42):
Perhaps alone in Turkey and even the world, Mustafa Kemal believed that Turks could become everything they had never been: modern, secular, prosperous and, above all, truly European, He became a one-man revolution, pushing and dragging a baffled and sometimes resistant nation toward the radical vision that blazed in his imagination.

Further, Atatürk replaced the Muslim calendar with a European one (Kinzer 43), and “rewarded Ankara for supporting the Nationalists by declaring it the country’s capital” (Roskin and Coyle 128 ) He also outlawed the fez – “the symbol of attachment of male Turks to Islam” (Hale 272) – and replaced it with brim hats, since “a brim kept a pious Muslim from touching his forehead to the ground, part of the Muslim prayer.” (Roskin and Coyle 130) In reaction to this, “the chief mufti of Egypt, who since the abolition of the caliphate had become a leading voice of Islam, proclaimed that any Muslim who wore a hat was an infidel and a sinner.” (Kinzer 44) Lastly, the Third Grand National Assembly Parliament (1927-1931) “disestablished Islam as the state religion,” a move that officially made Turkey secular. (Roskin and Coyle 130)

Yet despite the previously mentioned positive Kemalist reforms and the fact that he was both an eloquent and charismatic leader, Charalambos Konstantinidis found (7) that Atatürk created animosity between Turkey’s various cultural and religious groups, a consequence that’s ripples are still being felt today:
Creating the myth of a unique Turkish nationality and imposing it by force, the Turkish elite awakened the defensive reflexes of threatened groups. At the same time, the promotion of secularism, as a pillar of modernity, in a Muslim country estrange the devout Muslims… Even though there was never an official definition, the new Turkish citizen was expected to be a secular, sunni Muslim speaking the Turkish language. Setting such preconditions meant excluding the nationally conscious Kurds, and to a certain extent even the politically aware Muslims, as well as the religiously heterodox Alewites, which altogether constituted about one fourth of the population.

In addition, John Tirman (2) found that Turkish Kurds were hit the hardest by Kemalist reforms. Tirman states that, “from 1923 on, Atatürk’s repression of Kurdish nationalism and even Kurdish identity was savage and predatory,” and reasons that, “the basis of the confrontation was Turkish nationalism” since its primary goal was to create a uniform Turkish state with citizens that only spoke Turkish and embraced Turkish culture above all else (2).

Further, despite his sweeping reforms, Atatürk preserved one of the Ottoman Empire’s most important tenets: the authority and prestige of the military, Konstantinidis (11) found. As one of the few successful Turkish commanders in the 1922 Turkish War of Independence with “a major battlefield victory [at Lausanne] to his credit, a magnificent one at that,” (Kinzer 38 ) Atatürk “emerged from the Great War as a hero.” (Kinzer 38 ) In fact, thanks to his military accomplishments, Kinzer found (39) that:
Mustafa Kemal was the logical figure around whom this defeated nation could rally. He eagerly embrace the savior’s role, winning the loyalty of disaffected officers and denouncing the dying regime in terms so contemptuous that its courts sentenced him to death in absentia.

Still, Atatürk’s later “reforms could not have been based merely on his – undeniably enormous – prestige as national liberator,” Konstantinidis wrote (11), concluding instead that it is the authority of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) to intervene in Turkey’s political process that both safeguarded secularism, and Atatürk’s very own Kemalist legacy.

The Protectors of Secularism

Indeed, force was mandated by Atatürk and was used in all instances when the country’s secularist quality was threatened. For instance, in May 1960, when “the ruling Democratic Party (Demokrat Parti – DP) became increasingly authoritarian and used the majoritarian framework of the 1924 Constitution to oppress the opposition Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi – CHP),” a group of officers took over, “in the name of ‘guardianship’ of the Kemalist nation-state” (CESS Task Force 23). Ultimately, as a result of the coup, a new constitution was created (in 1961) that mandated the military’s role as protector of Turkish secularism, and created the National Security Council (NSC), “established as an advisory body to the government on both internal and external security and designed to enable the military to convey their views to ministers formally” (CESS Task Force 23).

If political actions or decisions are deemed to interfere with the country’s secular landscape (as stated within the Constitution of 1924, written by Atatürk), TAF has the authority to step in. Military interventions also took place in Turkey in 1971 and 1980, and in both instances, “the military argued that they were fulfilling their legal obligation and their action had popular support” (CESS Task Force 13) As such, Atatürk created a state wherein democracy is threatened for the sake of upholding secularism (often through violence) and wherein such drastic means enjoy widespread acceptance throughout Turkish society.

Ultimately, the CESS report (13) found that:
[Atatürk] made the military an important partner in establishing and safeguarding a unitary and secular state with a reforming agenda and a European vocation. [Atatürk] embraced democracy, adopting a parliamentary system of government with the assurance that the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) would defend their 1924 Constitution if the republic’s unity or secular character (or the democratic ideal) were never endangered.

By granting TAF this ability, the “democratic ideal” has in fact been endangered, and this facet of the Constitution is primarily responsible for leaving the Turkish-EU accession talks in an uncomfortable state of limbo. Thus, “against the background of earlier interventions it is hardly surprising that the EU’s first communications on the Turkish bid for Union membership voiced concern about ‘the major role played by the army in political life.” (CESS Task Force 14) Still, the Task Force found (15) that most Turks feel that this military authority is wholly necessary, as “neither the TAF nor the Turkish electorate regarded any [of the military intervention] as fundamentally anti-democratic behavior but, rather, as extraordinary action fully necessary to safeguard democracy in the country.”

In fact, not only is the military’s role virtually unquestioned throughout Turkey, but TAF (and Atatürk, in fact) also succeeded in building a permanent and continued support base through the promotion of ultra-nationalism. Atatürk (“Speech”) said:
We owe the success to determinative cooperation between the Turkish nation and its esteemed Army. I never doubt that the great civil character of Turkish and its great civil ability will rise as a sun over high horizon of civilization, through further development. Happy is the man who calls himself a Turk.
Thus, by arguing that the success of the Turkish nation is inherently linked to the military and its ability to intervene in virtually all aspects of society, Atatürk was creating a society of individuals who blindly tie militarism to democracy, and can’t envision it any other way. As a result, as previously mentioned, Atatürk is still admired throughout most of Turkey today, and “the Atatürk faith [of Kemalism]… has its clergy, military and political elite, faithful beyond measure and ceaselessly on the watch for apostates” (Kinzer 35-36).
Turkey and the European Union

Ultimately, many Turks feel that their country is more European than anything else, and that joining the EU is a natural choice. “Under Kemal Atatürk, a concerted effort was made to redefine [Turkey’s] political identity as a nation-state on the European model, committed to secular political values, and institutional and economic modernization. As a result, most Turks tend to see their country as being more a part of Europe than of the Middle East,” William Hale found (268). Nonetheless, European leaders still have major qualms with Turkish accession, the most important of which include the political power of the TAF, restrictions placed by the Turkish Constitution on free speech, and human rights violations that are protected by Turkish law (Task Force, 31-32).

Further, the proposed five-year ban of present Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) from Turkish politics is another major blockade to EU accession talks today. The AKP is a moderate Islamic party that has moved towards allowing the headscarf to be worn inside Turkish government buildings and universities, something that has been outlawed along Atatürk’s secularist line (“Turkey’s Erdogan”). The party received 46.6 percent of the popular vote and 341 seats in July 2007’s Parliamentary elections, compared to 20.9 percent and 99 seats for the Republican People’s Party (CHP) that promotes Atatürk’s ideals (2007 Progress Report 6).

“No one can portray the AKP as a focal point against secularism. The 16.5 million people who voted for us did so believing in its (values) as a party which is democratic, secular and (is a supporter of the) principles of social rule of law,” Erdogan stated, as reported by the Trend News Agency (“Turkey’s Erdogan”). Nonetheless, as of a decision announced yesterday, the AKP narrowly avoided the ban, as “six members of Turkey’s Constitutional Court voted to close it for violating the country’s secular principles, but seven were required” (“Turkey’s Governing Party”). The party will lose some of its funding, the article explained, however it will retain its existing control of Parliament, the Presidency and the government. “By overcoming the case, the party and its supporters have prevailed over the country’s staunchly secular old guard, which has steered the country from behind the scenes since Turkey’s founding by Atatürk in 1923.” (“Turkey’s Governing Party”) Ultimately, this result is a great step forward for democracy in Turkey, and a signal to the country’s secular nationalists that things may indeed be changing.

Still, it is evident that Atatürk’s vision for Turkey would be achieved should the country join the EU. Nonetheless, it seems that Atatürk’s followers today, who are increasingly unwilling to compromise their ideals, the same ones blazed by Atatürk himself, may prevent accession from happening. In fact, Konstantinidis (11) found it paradoxical that “the military’s actions are justified on the grounds of the protection of the Kemalist principles, even though westernization, as envisaged by Atatürk, entailed the subordination of the military to civilians.”

Private – and Public – Reverence

It is interesting to note the degree to which Kemalism is promoted through the Turkish education system, and how as a result, it is ingrained into the minds of even the youngest citizens. For instance, Kinzer describes how a young Turkish boy, when asked to write an essay about love by his third-grade teacher, wrote that, “Love means love for Atatürk. Love means love for Atatürk’s mother… Love means love for Atatürk’s father” (35). Evidently, as the above example illustrates, reverence for Atatürk is cultivated at a young age in Turkey – a phenomenon that could explain how extreme, nationalist views are passed on from generation to generation, all in the name of Kemalism. Kinzer summarized (35):
By instinctively associating the deepest human emotion with the person of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, this young boy showed how fully he had already absorbed the holy creed of the Turks. According to its constitution, Turkey is a secular state with no official religion. But the truth is that Turks profess, and must profess, a highly developed faith enveloping and defining every aspect of their lives. It is the cult of Atatürk, founder of the Turkish Republic and now a virtual deity.

Still, the worship of Atatürk and his ideas is not only taught in schools or at home; it is also professed and safeguarded in Turkey’s very own legal system. Most notably, Article 301 of the Turkish Criminal Code “penalizes insulting ‘Turkishness,’ the Republic and the organs and institutions of the state” and “the restrictive jurisprudence established in 2006 by the court of Cassation on the article 301 remains in force” in Turkey (Progress Report 15). Ultimately, in line with Article 301, countless individuals within Turkey have been prosecuted, and some violently attacked or killed, for publicly criticizing an aspect of Turkish society or worse still, Atatürk himself.

For instance, in January 2008, a Turkish professor was sentenced to 15 months in prison (a sentence that was later suspended) for criticizing Atatürk. Atilla Yayla, who presently teaches at Buckingham University in England, said at a conference on Turkey and the European Union in 2006 that “the years in which Atatürk imposed his secular revolution were not as progressive as Turks are taught to believe” and “questioned the near-monopoly that Atatürk has on public statues and portraits.” (“Turkey’s Crumbling Dream”)

That same year, a Turkish woman named Nuray Bezirgan went on the country’s Teke Tek television program in June and said, “Are we allowed to not love Atatürk? If I’m not going to get in trouble, then no, I don’t,” when asked if she loved the founder of the Republic, as reported by the Turkish Daily News. (“Trouble for girl”) “When Atatürk received his authority from the Sultan, I don’t think he was given it to create a secular republic. If people are oppressing me in the name of Kemalism, then you can’t expect me to like Atatürk,” Berzirgan, who wears a headscarf, added. (“Trouble for Girl”)

The woman, the Turkish Daily news reported, may face close to five years in prison in accordance with a Turkish Penal Code’s law concerning crimes committed against Atatürk. Numbered 5816 and adopted on 25 July 1951, it states that, “anyone who publicly insults or curses the memory of Atatürk shall be imprisoned with a heavy sentence of between one and three years,” and that “if the crimes outlined are committed publicly will have the penalty imposed increased by a proportion of one-half.” (Human Rights Watch “List”) The law also states that anyone who defaces or breaks a statue or the grave of Atatürk will face up to five years in prison. (HRW “List”)

Lastly, and even more unsettling than the last two examples, is the 2007 murder of Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink outside his Istanbul office. “Dink’s killing was apparently politically and ethnically motivated; he was identified by his murderers as an Armenian who had been convicted in court for ‘insulting Turkishness,’” wrote Human Rights Watch (“Dink’s killing”) in 2008. Indeed, prior to his death, Dink was convicted under Article 301 for “using the term ‘genocide’ in a statement made to Reuters news agency to describe the massacres of Armenians in Anatolia at the end of the Ottoman Empire.” (“Dink’s killing”) His 17-year-old killer was appointed by an armed gang of nationalist youth who had been sending Dink death threats for a period of 18 months prior to the shooting, HRW reported. The article also explained that the gang was primarily motivated by nationalism and a desire to protect Atatürk’s secular state (“Dink’s killing”).

The above-mentioned examples point to a Turkish society that is using Atatürk’s ideals and institutions to further their authoritarian and oppressive goals today. Once again, secularism is being placed above all else, and thus democracy and freedom of speech have been replaced by senseless violence, all in the name of Atatürk’s Kemalist ideology. Turkish Muslim columnist Mustafa Akyol wrote (“Meet the Monster”):
Some elements of the media, along with some pundits, bureaucrats and politicians, systematically spread the fear that Turkey is facing existential threats. Kurds, Armenians, Jews, Greeks, missionaries, non-nationalist Muslims — anybody who falls outside the narrow definition of a “good Turk” — are all seen as “internal enemies,” who are in bed with the external ones — the Europeans, the Americans, Iraqi Kurds, and, actually, the whole world. The militant who killed Dink is the product of this popular hysteria. Unless we accept this bitter fact and start to think seriously about our internal fascism, it is likely that Turkey will produce more of them.

Ultimately, as stated in an August 2007 International Crisis Group report (ii), Turkey can only expect to join the European Union as soon as 2017. And do to so, it will have to make some serious changes, including most notably, “resum(ing) with real commitment the reform process aimed at adapting Turkish laws to EU norms, particularly removing Article 301 of the penal code or redrafting it in a way that prevents its use in a manner incompatible with EU norms,” and “us(ing) the mandate from the Turkish electorate to build a strong, pro-reform political consensus that can marginalize secularist and nationalist scaremongers.” (ii)

Atatürk’s Ultimate Legacy

“A man may die, nations may rise and fall, but an idea lives on.” (Quote World) Those words, uttered by former U. S. President John F. Kennedy, ring particularly true in the case of Turkey and its indisputable leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. For not only have Atatürk’s ideas lived on decades after his death, but they have continued to influence virtually every aspect of Turkish society, from politics and the military, to religion and social customs. And in the eyes of most Turks and countless others worldwide, his reforms stand the test of time as examples of courage, idealism and unfettered determination.

Still, in today’s Turkey, Atatürk’s rhetoric and amendments have created a nation of extreme nationalists who, upon viewing a threat to their secular state, are prepared to use force to protect it. Violence, legal persecution and ostracism are merely a few of the methods used to ensure that Turkish secularism is preserved, and ironically, democracy maintained. By allowing the Turkish Armed Forces to intervene in the country’s democratic political process, democracy itself suffers, and the country caught between East and West is hurting its chances to join the European Union.

In the end, Atatürk’s major legacy to the people of Turkey is the institutions he created to ensure that secular principles and priorities were not only protected by the country’s official Constitution, but ingrained within the minds of Turkish citizens as well. He created a country wherein violence is permissible if it’s to safeguard secularism, wherein the democratic process can be pushed aside on a whim, and ultimately, wherein the ends can always justify the means. Still, that is not to say that the dangerous road down which Atatürk’s legacy has turned can’t be changed. In fact, Tirman (3) argues that, “one can say that Kemalism will ultimately lose its power,” and concludes that the present-day situation of violence and corruption “indicates how tenuous Atatürk’s legacy may be; how easily it may disassemble with the right combination of charismatic leadership and the internal will to change.”

Ultimately, those two things – charismatic leadership and a will to change – are what turned Mustafa Kemal Atatürk into the legend he is today. And, in light of the hot bed of conflict and oppression that is Turkish society today, it seems only fitting that those two things are what can remedy the situation, once and for all.

Buck opens the trunk of his light blue minivan. Rummaging through old baseball equipment, he finally finds what he’s been searching for: ibuprofen.

“I’m 60 years old,” he says, laughing, before popping two little red pills into his mouth.

Buck – known off the field as Pres Pieraccini – is about to stand over home plate, a wooden bat in hand, and lead a practice for the Whately Pioneers vintage baseball team.

The ibuprofen is just a precaution.

“I used to be a really good player. I’m still a pretty good player, but …” He pauses. “I’m 60 years old,” he says again, a smile still on his face. “I just love baseball. It’s a beautiful thing.”

Buck loves the sport so much, in fact, he’s playing on four teams this summer, including the Pioneers, which draws players from Northampton north to Vermont, ranging in age from 19 to 61.

The Pioneers put on the puffy three-quarter pants and oversized, button-down baseball jerseys that many fans of the game have seen only in pictures. They swing heavy, wooden bats and use gloves that look made for weeding the garden, rather than catching a ball.

“We’re 15 brave baseball players,” says Buck, the team’s captain. “We do it because we just love doing it.”

And it means following a whole new – or old, rather – set of rules.

They date back to the 1880s, when baseball was known as a gentleman’s game. Not surprisingly, vintage baseball comes with a vintage code of ethics. Players must address the umpire as “sir,” and showboating or taunting is forbidden.

The Pioneers play in the New England Vintage Baseball League, now in its first official season.

The team is one of 225 clubs in 32 states affiliated with the Vintage Base Ball Federation, headed by former New York Yankees pitcher Jim Bouton, which organized the Vintage Base Ball Northeast Regional Playoffs starting this weekend and the World Championship next month.

“We’ll have to fight our way in,” Buck says. “But the Whately Pioneers at this point, I’m going to say, are officially a pretty good team.”

Its players are drawn not only to the league’s high level of play, but to the game’s gentlemanly aspect.

“Once you put on the uniform, it’s like you assume the persona. You step back in time and you become these players,” says assistant captain Tom “Hammer” Hamre, 61, of Easthampton. “People are playing just as hard, but you don’t see the arguments” that mark today’s sport. The players “approach the whole game differently.”

One modern addition

Whately’s roster includes someone who likely would not have been playing in the late 19th century: a woman.

“I haven’t seen any other” women playing vintage, says Melissa Frydlo of Northampton.

Nicknamed Albie, the 36-year-old says that being the only female Pioneer doesn’t deter her from appreciating the competitive yet respectful nature of the game.

“Vintage is pretty much a different sport to me. You have to play fundamentals. I’ve been playing baseball for 25 years, so I try my best,” says Albie, adding that she thinks more women would play if they knew the league existed.

Jay Sadowski of Montague City, known to his teammates as Spider, says he was aware of the league, but was skeptical at first.

“When I first heard about vintage baseball, I thought it was kind of silly,” Spider says. “I didn’t realize that you had to be twice as good a player to do it.”

By way of explanation, he reaches into a long black baseball bag, stained white with infield sand, and pulls out what looks like an oven mitt.

“The gloves are tiny,” Spider explains, tossing the brown leather glove in the air. “We don’t wear helmets, and the rules are tough to remember. They’re so different” from modern baseball.

Still, Spider says that he was hooked on vintage baseball after an experience straight out of “Field of Dreams” when he played for the Westfield Wheelmen at last year’s inaugural Vintage Baseball World Championship.

“We went through the woods to get to the field, and the whole thing was all grass. It was all painted up,” describes Spider. “It was like stepping into another world. I was pretty much hooked since then. It was a great experience.”

Some 6,000 fans watched the 2007 playoff and championship games in Westfield.

And while the World Championship is complete with costumed actors, vintage signs and posters and period music, regular-season games are also appealing, say the Pioneers.

“People stop their cars along the road when we’re playing,” says Buck, adding that at last year’s championship, the Pioneers signed autographs for fans. “Thirty to 40 people watch our vintage games usually. It really is an entertaining game to watch.”

Buck explains, “For those people who don’t get it, it’s just being more obvious about how timeless baseball is. We turn the clock back 100 years, and you see it’s the same game. And that’s unique to baseball. I can’t imagine not playing.”

Hammer adds, “The people who enjoy vintage and stay with it have a respect for the game.”

The oldest Pioneer jokes that the only reason he’s on the team is because he’s the only player who can remember the late 19th-century rules.

“I’ve played baseball for over 55 years now,” Hammer says. “I’ve used wood (bats) all my life. We didn’t even have full batting helmets when I played Little League.”

His goal, he says, is to play until age 75 and “then drop dead on the field.”

Buck feels the same way. “They say you have two deaths. Your baseball death, when you can’t play anymore, and your real death. And (my baseball death) is coming sooner rather than later.”

It took about two months for me to finally get answers from the Czech Senator about the proposed U.S. radar base. It would have been great to include his comments in my final paper at the Danish School of Journalism, but unfortunately that couldn’t happen. Here is the transcript of our e-mail correspondence anyway.

1. What is the Czech Senate of Parliament’s stance regarding the radar base?

Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic has not dealt with the issue of possible location of the American radar base yet. We ought to wait until the Government delivers the agreement dully signed by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic and United States of America to the Senate of the Parliament of the Czech Republic. Only then we will deal with it. Minister of Foreign Affairs has been informing the Senators on regular basis throughout the entire course of negotiations and the communication was therefore very good indeed. However, individual political parties represented in the Senate do have different opinions and standpoints. The Civic Democratic Party generally supports the radar base while the Communists are distinctively against. Other political parties do not have a clear stance.

2. Have Czech politicians taken public opinion into consideration when deciding on the missile defence system?

Defence issues are very complicated and sensitive indeed. Nobody is interested in arms drive or war situation. On the other hand a longsighted politician considers not only the real, but also possible security threats and needs to decide accordingly. However, one must thoroughly explain the decision making process to the citizens and clarify the context as well. The Czech Government is successful in doing this with the radar, because the latest opinion polls indicate the support for radar among the Czech citizens is modestly raising. Unfortunately, the opposition party demagogically misinforms the public thus disturbs the healthy spirit among the citizens.

3. The anti-base people are pushing for a referendum on this issue. Is a referendum possible, and why or why not?

There are three topics that should never be subject to referendum. Taxation, questions of race and issues related to defence of a sovereign country. In order to make a qualified decision for example about the radar, you need plenty of information, but at the same time you cannot disseminate some of the information for security reasons without jeopardizing safety of the citizens. Therefore the citizens entrusted the right to decide about defence in general to military experts and politicians. On top of that defence of a country cannot be subject to a political competition provided you are not a Communist.
Furthermore, there is no reason for a referendum in case of the radar base. There was a reason for referendum when we joined the European Union, because we had to decide whether or not we will transfer part of our sovereignty to the multinational authorities in Brussels. However, there was no reason for a referendum when we joined NATO and there is no reason for a referendum when it comes to the radar base decision. After all it is the Government and the Parliament who decide about involvement of our troops in missions abroad. This issue is politically misused which is a great pity.

4. Is there a timeline in mind for when the deal between the Czech Republic and the US will be completed?

This is a question for the Government. Generally speaking, we are not being pressed by time. Other agreements have to be finalised and then the Government will present the complete package to the both chambers of the Parliament at once. We anticipate that this will happen in the autumn of 2008.

5. What type of coalition will be necessary for the deal to pass through Czech Parliament? ie: Will the Green Party have an important role?

The radar deal will be decided in both chambers of the Czech Parliament. All parties have an equal importance irrespective of how they decide to vote. Nevertheless each and every party will clearly indicate with their vote how serious they are about democracy, its strengthening and defence. The Green Party should support the deal considering the fact that their main requirement and concern has been met (radar base an integral part of NATO strategy). I believe the Green Party will support the deal. There will be no troubles in passing the deal in the upper house, in the Senate thanks to its current composition. However, there could be some issues in the lower house.

6. How important is NATO approval for the legitimacy of this project?

The radar base in our country and the interceptor missile base in Poland are legitimate projects anyway. In case the system is to be integrated into the NATO defence systems, which was already supported by NATO representatives as well as by Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs of countries involved, the project would gain even more importance. It will be even bigger obligation for us and it also magnifies the importance of our decision. A number of bilateral projects that were originally initiated by individual NATO member countries later became an integral part of the entire NATO system. And it would be the same story in our case.

7. Do you feel that the upcoming US election will influence the project?

Defence of a country is usually not subject to actual political influences and moods. This is especially true in case of defence of the United States of America. This is a very serious issue and if the experts come up with a thesis that the threat is imminent every responsible politician has to decide whether he will protect his own country or whether he will expose his homeland to security threats due to his pure populism. I do not believe there are politicians in the USA that would behave in such a populist way. On top of that the Democrats do not even doubt the project. The very basic foreign policy trend does not change after any elections in the USA.

8. Do you feel that the base will make the Czech Republic a target for terrorist attacks, or cause consequences from Russia?

The Czech Republic joined the anti-Saddam coalition. Our troops are very successful in their operations in Afghanistan. We are in war against terrorism together with the Americans and other countries right from the beginning. Therefore the threat is real for us. But that is the reason why we need to defend ourselves and get ready for possible threats.
And the Russians are very well aware of the fact that neither our radar nor the interceptor missiles will be targeted against Russia. They just started to play a diplomatic and political game, which is something quite understandable if you consider their internal politics. They adopted a similar approach during NATO enlargement. Their reactions should rather speed up our decision making process and consent with the radar base. We have already once hesitated to decide whether to join the West and adopt the Marshall plan or whether to move towards the East and refuse it. We then felt the consequences of the decision taken by the Communist leaders of our country for another forty years day after day. Moreover, membership of the Czech Republic in the European Union, NATO and now the prospective radar base clearly confirm that our country has returned to the democratic world for good. At the same time this very much changes the line of demarcation after the Second World War as well as division of Europe.

9. How would you describe the US-Czech relationship? How will this relationship change or be affected if the base is constructed? What if it isn’t constructed?

Relationships of the Czech Republic with the USA are very good indeed. I personally perceive our co-operation with the USA in the field of defence, science, research, etc. as an integral part of our integration into the European structures. We are NATO members. And I am convinced that majority of our population is well aware of the fact who gave Europe the helping hand in the First World War, in the Second World War, during the Cold War and last, but not least in the War for Balkans – the United States of America.
On top of that acceptance of the radar base will give the Czech Republic access to state-of-the-art scientific laboratories and research. It will extend mutual co-operation in research, science and education. Our alliance with the USA will be even closer and we will also be perceived as the real defenders and advocates of democracy and Western hence our values.

10. Do you think that the missile defence base will be constructed in the Czech Republic?

Yes, I am convinced that it will be built and I will personally vote in favour of the radar base. Furthermore, I will do my best by virtue of my position of the Senate President to get the treaties ratified.

The last day at Sportsnet… was sad. The week passed by EXTREMELY quickly and I wish I was staying for a bit longer. I spent the day in the web department and watched people putting articles together. It was cool to see the whole process, as web writing is so timely. They got a call about Todd Bertuzzi being placed on waivers, and within the next five minutes, the article was published.

In the afternoon, I sat with someone who puts video content onto the website. It wasn’t very busy today, so we basically sat around talking about an ever-important sports issue: Montreal versus Toronto. It was cool though, even though talking about the Expos made me emotional. hah

Overall, I really liked it at Sportsnet. Even though it wasn’t very busy, I learned a lot and definitely benefited from my time in Toronto. The people were so friendly and helpful, and willing to answer all my questions. I seriously hope I can go back sometime soon.

And, believe it or not, Toronto even gained a few brownie points this time around.